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vABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the effects of China entering 
the World Trade Organization on the United States' wireless 
telecommunication industry.  This thesis explores whether 
the American wireless telecom industry will benefit from 
China's accession into the WTO.  The working hypothesis of 
the thesis is that American wireless telecom companies will 
receive far-reaching economic benefit from China's entry 
into the WTO.  Additionally, this thesis explores the 
effects the entry in the WTO will have on China's telecom 
policy toward allowing foreign companies to own and operate 
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1I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
China's fifteen-year effort to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) ended on December 11, 2001 when China 
became an official member of the WTO.  China negotiated 
bilateral agreements with each existing member as a 
requirement to join the WTO.  The long-awaited bilateral 
WTO agreement with the United States was finalized on 15 
November 1999 and paved the way for Congress to grant 
permanent normal trade relations (formerly known as "most 
favored nation (MFN)" trading status) to China starting on 
1 January 2002, which was another important step toward 
China's WTO accession. 
Beginning with President's Nixon's visit to China in 
1972 and Deng Xiaoping's push toward market economics in 
the 1980s, the WTO is the most important milestone in 
China's integration with the world and will have a profound 
impact on China's telecommunication (telecom) industry.  
China's entry into the WTO will no doubt alter current 
Chinese telecom policy against allowing foreign countries 
to own or operate parts of the telecom network in order to 
become compliant under WTO regulations. 
Furthermore, American wireless telecom companies will 
likely benefit from China's entry in the WTO due to the 
lifting of tariffs imposed on the U.S. telecom products 
prior to China's entry into WTO.  Additionally, current 
tariffs will be eliminated by 2005 under the bilateral 
agreement reached between the United States and China.  
 
 
2B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the effects of China entering 
the WTO on the U.S. wireless telecom industry.  Of 
particular interest, this thesis explores whether the U.S. 
wireless telecom industry will benefit from China's 
accession into the WTO.  The working hypothesis of the 
thesis is that U.S. wireless telecom companies will receive 
far-reaching economic benefit from China's entry into the 
WTO.  Additionally, this thesis explores the effects the 
entry in the WTO will have on China's telecom policy toward 
allowing foreign companies to own and operate parts of the 
network. 
This thesis consists of five chapters, including this 
introduction.  Chapter II provides background information 
on the WTO from its beginnings in the failed attempt to 
create an International Trade Organization to the five 
functions laid out in the WTO charter.  This chapter then 
discusses why it took China 15 years to become part of the 
WTO.  The third and most important section in this chapter 
looks at the telecom commitments China made as a precursor 
to joining the WTO.  Particular emphasis is given to 
China's scheduled commitments on its mobile telecom 
industry.  Lastly, Chapter II addresses what WTO accession 
means to China.   
Chapter III surveys the historical evolution of 
Chinese telecom policy toward foreign involvement.  It 
breaks down Chinese telecom policy into five time periods.  
Particular emphasis is given to the pre-1949 and post-1998 
sections.  The pre-1949 section recounts foreign companies' 
abuse of the Chinese telecom industry, which subsequently 
lead to a xenophobic stance and ban on foreign involvement.  
Lastly, the post-1998 section demonstrates the dramatic 
3change in Chinese telecom policy toward foreign involvement 
and the commitments China agreed to as part of the United 
States and China bilateral agreement in November 1999, 
which helped pave the way for China to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
Chapter IV explores the impact China's joining the WTO 
has had on U.S. wireless telecom companies.  Several of the 
U.S. telecom companies are examined with respect to what 
type and amount of contracts they are receiving in China.  
This chapter assesses whether the U.S. companies are truly 
benefiting from China entry into the WTO and whether the 
commitments China made as part of the WTO accession 
agreement are only superficial.  Finally, Chapter V offers 
a summary of principal conclusions and considers the 
security implications for China by allowing foreign 
companies to own part of China's telecom network.  Lastly, 
Chapter V will summarize the answers to the research 
questions.         
C. SCOPE OF THESIS  
This thesis attempts to limit the scope of this 
potentially broad topic by exploring the effects of China 
entering the WTO on the U.S. wireless telecommunication 
industry.  It does not explore the effects on other 
countries' industries.  Additionally, it focuses only on 
the wireless telecom industry and not other industries that 
might fall under the telecommunications realm or WTO.  
Lastly, this thesis examines the effects of China's 
telecommunication policy of allowing foreigners to own and 
operate part China's telecom infrastructure and the 
security implications associated with the change.  
 
 
4D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
There is one primary and three secondary research 
questions this thesis addresses.  The primary research 
question is whether the U.S. wireless telecom industry will 
benefit from China's accession into the WTO.  Even though 
it has been less than two years since China entered the WTO 
and many future effects have not been realized, this thesis 
attempts to measure the benefit to U.S. telecom companies.  
The first of the secondary questions is what are the 
security implications of China allowing foreign companies 
to own part of its network?  Another secondary question is 
whether accession into the WTO will change China telecom 
policy toward foreign involvement?  The last secondary 
question asks which U.S. wireless telecom companies will be 
affected most by China's accession into the WTO?   
 
5II.  CHINA AND THE WTO 
 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
China's fifteen-year effort to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) ended on December 11, 2001 when China 
became an official member of the WTO.1  No other country's 
accession into the WTO was as controversial or as 
prolonged.  China negotiated bilateral agreements with each 
existing member as a requirement to join the WTO.  The 
long-awaited bilateral WTO agreement between China and the 
United States was finalized on November 15, 19992 and paved 
the way for Congress to grant permanent normal trade 
relations (formally known as "most favored nation" trading 
status) to China starting in January 1, 20023 which was 
another important step to China's WTO accession.  
Perhaps the most remarkable breakthrough in the China 
WTO accession negotiations came with China's acceptance of 
substantial liberalization commitments in telecom services.  
It is important to point out just how much of a sticking 
point this aspect of the negotiations had been.  As late as 
1998, Chinese negotiators were indicating that it was 
unrealistic to expect China to make any significant 
commitments respecting market access to telecom services.4  
Subsequently, China had shown a little flexibility in 
allowing some market access in a limited number of cities.  
                    
1 The WTO Homepage, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; 
Internet; accessed 21 January 2002. 
2 The White House Homepage, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011227-1.html; 
Internet; accessed 21 January 2002. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ostry, Sylvia, China and the Long March to Global Trade: The 
accession of China to the World Trade Organization (New York, 
NY:Routledge, 2002), pg 80.  
6However, after Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Washington in 
April 1999, China for the first time made significant 
commitments to open up its telecom industry, which allowed 
the bilateral agreement to become possible.5  Without 
concessions from the Chinese regarding the telecom 
industry, few people think the omni-important bilateral 
agreement between China and United States could have become 
reality. 
This chapter first provides background information on 
the WTO from its beginnings in the failed attempt to create 
an International Trade Organization, to the five functions 
laid out in the WTO charter.  Next, this chapter discusses 
why it took China 15 years to become part of the WTO.  The 
third and most important section in this chapter looks at 
the telecom commitments China made as a precursor to 
joining the WTO.  Particular emphasis is given to China's 
scheduled commitments on its mobile telecom industry.  
Lastly, this chapter addresses what WTO accession means to 
China. 
B.   THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
The World Trade Organization was created on 1 January 
1995 and marked the biggest reform of international trade 
since Second World War.6  The WTO had its beginnings in the 
failed attempt to create an International Trade 
Organization (ITO) as part of the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7  Up to 1994, the trading system 
                    
5 Ibid. 
6 The WTO Homepage, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm; Internet; accessed 21 
January 2002. 
7 Panitchpakdi, Supachai and Mark L. Clifford China and the WTO: 
Changing China, Changing World Trade (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons 
(Asia) Pte Ltd, 2002), pg 55. 
7came under GATT, which was salvaged from the aborted 
attempt to create the ITO.8 
From 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) provided the rules for much of world trade 
and saw some of the highest growth rates in international 
commerce during those periods.9  It seemed well established, 
but throughout those 47 years, it was only a temporary 
agreement.  The original intention was to create a third 
institution handling international economic cooperation, 
paralleling the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.10  
The plan envisioned by over 50 countries was to create 
an International Trade Organization (ITO) as a specialized 
agency of the United Nations.  However, the draft ITO 
Charter was too ambitious.  It extended way beyond world 
trade disciplines to include rules on employment, commodity 
agreements, restrictive business practices, international 
investment, and services.11  Even before the charter was 
finally approved, 23 of the 50 participants decided in 1946 
to negotiate to reduce and bind customs tariffs.12  With the 
Second World War only recently ended, they wanted to give 
an early boost to trade liberalization and to begin to 
correct the legacy of protectionist measures that remained 
in place from the early 1930s.   
This first round of negotiations resulted in 45,000 
tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about 
                    
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pg 56. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The WTO Homepage, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm; Internet; accessed 21 
January 2002.  
12 Ibid. 
8one-fifth of the world’s total.13  The 23 countries also 
agreed to accept some of the trade rules of the draft ITO 
Charter.  They believed this should be done temporarily in 
order to protect the value of the tariff concessions they 
had negotiated.14  The combined package of trade rules and 
tariff concessions became known as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade signed in 1947, entered into effect in 
January 1948, while the ITO Charter was still being 
negotiated.15  The 23 participating members became founding 
GATT members, officially known as “contracting parties”.16   
Although the ITO Charter was finally endorsed at a UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948, 
ratification in some national legislatures proved 
impossible.17  The most serious opposition was in the U.S. 
Congress, even though the U.S. government had been one of 
the driving forces.  In 1950, the U.S. government announced 
that it would not seek Congressional ratification of the 
Havana Charter, and the ITO was effectively dead.  Even 
though it was temporary, the GATT remained the only 
multilateral instrument governing international trade from 
1948 until the WTO was established in 1995.  The WTO 
currently has 146 members as of 4 April 2003 and has 
another 30 trying to get in.18 
The principal objectives of the WTO include the 
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, 
expanding production and trade, and allowing optimal use of 







9the world's resources.19  Additionally, the WTO applies to 
production of and trade in services (GATT only spoke of 
goods) and it states the objective of sustainable 
development to "seek both to protect and preserve the 
environment."20  Furthermore, the WTO recognizes the need 
for positive efforts to ensure that developing countries 
"secure a share in international trade commensurate with 
the needs of their economic development."21  The way the WTO 
achieves these objectives is similar to the way the GATT 
achieved them, through "reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations."22 
The WTO basically has five functions laid out in its 
charter.  First, and most broad, is to "facilitate the 
implementation, administration, and operation, and further 
the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements" and also to "provide the framework for 
the implementation, administration and operation of the 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements."23  Second, the WTO is to be 
a negotiating forum.  The third and fourth functions of the 
WTO are to administer the arrangements for the settlements 
of disputes that may arise between members of the WTO and 
for the review of trade policies.24  Finally, the WTO is to 
co-operate with the International Monetary Fund and the 








World Bank "with a view to achieving greater coherence in 
global economic policymaking."25 
The WTO Agreement provides for two ways of becoming a 
Member of the organization.  The first "original 
membership" covers the situation of governments which were 
contracting parties to the old GATT.26  However, the 
possibility by this route was available for only for a 
limited period.  The second approach to membership is 
"accession" by negotiating the terms of membership with the 
governments that are already members of the WTO.  The 
conditions for accession are not specified and are vaguely 
to be "on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO."27 
However, once membership has been achieved, "original 
members" of the WTO and "accession members" will be on the 
same footing, subject to any special terms of accession.28  
Additionally, membership requires all governments ensure 
the conformity of their laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with their obligations under the 
WTO agreements.  This is the primary reason why the WTO 
will cause major changes in China's telecom policy.  China 
will need to reform many of its telecom laws and policies 
to become compliant under WTO rules and regulations. 
C.   WHY 15 YEARS FOR CHINA TO ENTER THE WTO? 
China officially applied to the GATT in July 1986 to 
resume its status as an original "contracting member."29  
However, after the WTO replaced the GATT in 1995, China's                     
25 Ibid. 
26 Fewsmith, Joseph, "China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the 
Agreement," NBR Publications: NBR Analysis, Vol. 10 No 5, December 
1999, pg 5 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Panitchpakdi, Supachai and Mark L. Clifford, China and the WTO: 
Changing China, Changing World Trade (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons 
(Asia) Pte Ltd, 2002), pg 55. 
11 
application was to become an "accession member" of the 
global trade organization.30  China was not officially 
granted membership until December 11, 2001, thereby taking 
over 15 years for China to become a member of the WTO, 
which was longer than any other member to date.   
There are a variety of factors that contributed to the 
delay in membership negotiations.  First, China’s 
insistence in revitalizing its status as a former founding 
member of GATT slowed the process.31  Secondly, the question 
if and how China's "socialist market economy" could fit 
into the GATT/WTO system delayed China's accession.32  Given 
that the WTO was set up for free market economies, 
incorporating the largest command economy into the 
disciplines of free market was no easy task.  Thirdly, the 
division of competences among Chinese ministries and 
institutions responsible for the process of accession 
slowed the process.33  The huge bureaucratic system the 
Chinese government operates no doubt contributed to the 
delay.  Fourthly, there was the difficult question of 
whether China should join the WTO as a developing or 
developed country.34  The lower down on the economic 
development chain a country is, the better concessions it 
will receive in its accession accord.  China will enjoy 
preferential conditions and arrangements, protection of and 
export subsidies for infant industries.  China wanted to 
enter the WTO as a developing country, whereas the United                     
30 Ibid., pg 56. 
31 Yang, Yongzheng, "China's WTO accession: why has it taken so 
long?," Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management Working Papers 
(Asia Pacific Press, 2000), page 8. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., pg 9. 
34 Drysdale, Peter and Ligang Song, China's Entry to the World Trade 
Organization: Strategic Issues and Quantitative Assessment (New York, 
NY: Routeledge, 2000), pg 25. 
12 
States wanted China to be entered as a developed country.  
Lastly, the negotiations with the United States over the 
bilateral WTO agreement and permanent normal trade 
relations (PNTR) status slowed the process.35   
From an American perspective, the suppression of 
student protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 contributed to 
the substantial delay for China's accession.36  After 
Tiananmen, the United States began to consider linking 
trade and economic issues with human right issues.    
China had to negotiate bilateral agreements with each 
existing member or invoke Article 13 with the existing 
member as a requirement to join the WTO.37  The long-awaited 
bilateral WTO agreement with the United States was 
finalized on November 15, 1999 under President Clinton.38  
However, the United States Congress still needed to grant 
China PNTR in order for the WTO agreement to become 
effective.  After much debate, Congress granted PNTR to 
China, starting in January 1, 2002, with an 83-15 vote from 
the Senate and a 237-197 vote from the House of 
Representatives.39  
Prior to granting PNTR, Title IV of the Trade Act of 
1974 to China, also known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, 
the United States had to renew MFN trade status with China 
                    
35 Ibid, page 24. 
36 Fewsmith, Joseph, "China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the  
Agreement," NBR Publications: NBR 
 Analysis, Vol. 10 No 5, December 1999, pg 2 
37 Magarinos, Carlos, China in the WTO: The Birth of a Catching-Up 
Strategy (New York,NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pg 33.     
38 The White House Homepage, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011227-1.html; 
Internet; accessed 21 January 2002. 
39 U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information 
Programs Homepage, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00091911.htm; 
Internet; accessed 2 March 2002. 
13 
on a yearly basis.  Because of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, 
the United States was not allowed to grant MFN status to 
non-market economies unless the President waived 
ineligibility.  This amendment was originally directed at 
the Soviet Union because of restrictions on emigration of 
certain Soviet citizens.  However, the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment applies to all non-market economies.  Therefore, 
for the United States to enjoy WTO benefits with respect to 
China after PRC accession, Congress needed to amend or 
repeal Jackson-Vanik to permit extension of PNTR to China.  
Currently, over 160 countries have PNTR status with the 
United States.40  The only countries the United States 
currently does not grant NTR are Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, 
North Korea, Serbia/Montenegro, and Vietnam.41 
Even if Congress failed to grant PNTR to China, it 
would not have stopped China from entering the WTO.  
Instead it would have given the European Union and Japan an 
advantage in trade with China.  If the United States did 
not grant PNTR, then China would have invoked the WTO's 
Article 13, which permits China not to apply WTO benefits 
to the United States.42  Under WTO rules, the United States 
also may invoke Article 13.  In either case, however, non-
application of WTO benefits by either country would deny 
U.S. firms the greater access to China's markets that WTO 
accession would bring.   
 
 
                    
40 The United States-China Business Council Homepage, 
http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/ntrfacts.html; Internet; accessed 13 
February 2002. 
41 Ibid. 
42 United States General Accounting Office Report, World Trade 
Organization: Status of China's Trade Commitments to the United States 
and Other Members, May 2000, pg 7. 
14 
D.   CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATION COMMITMENTS 
During the bilateral agreement negotiations between 
the United States and China, intense debate occurred over 
the tariff levels and foreign ownership percentages for 
several United States products including agriculture, 
financial services, and telecommunications.43  The 
discussion on telecoms was one of the most intense.  
Nevertheless, both sides made concessions in the end which 
resulted in the November 15, 1999 signing of the WTO 
bilateral agreement by President Clinton.   
There were three main commitments China made as part 
of the preliminary deal between the United States and 
China.  These commitments marked China's first agreement to 
open its telecoms sector to direct foreign investment.  
Additionally, one of the key parts of the deal was tariffs 
on information technology products, such as computers, 
semiconductors and internet-related equipment will fall 
from the current 13.3 percent to zero by 2005.44  Through 
these commitments, China will become a member of the Basic 
Telecoms Agreement, which was originally reached in Geneva 
in February 1997 among 69 countries to liberalize their 
telecom service markets for competition.45 
The first commitment involved regulatory principles.  
It stated that China agrees to implement the pro-
competitive regulatory principles in the Basic Telecom 
Agreement and subsequent Annex A of the Reference Paper on 
                    
43 Fewsmith, Joseph, "China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the 
Agreement," NBR Publications: NBR Analysis, Vol. 11 No 2, January 2000, 
pg 5  
44 Summary of the U.S. -China Bilateral WTO Agreement; available 
from: Http://www.uschina.org/public/991115a.html; Internet; accessed 21 
January 2002. 
45 Fan, Xing, Communication and Information in China: Regulatory 
Issues, Strategic Implications  (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 2001, pg 167. 
15 
Regulatory Principles46, and agrees to technology-neutral 
scheduling which allowed foreign suppliers to use any 
technology they choose to provide telecom services.47  
The second commitment involved geographic scope of 
services.  China will now phase out all geographic 
restrictions for mobile telecoms in five years.  This was 
further reduced to three years in the EU bilateral 
agreement with China.  Additionally, China's key telecoms 
services corridor in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, 
which represents approximately 75 percent of all domestic 
traffic, will open immediately on accession in all telecom 
services.48 
The third and most important commitment involved 
investment.  Prior to the agreement, China did not allow 
foreign investment in telecom services.  However, according 
to the announced agreement, both parties agreed to set the 
foreign investment cap for operators at 49 percent for 
foreign ownership in mobile services within five years of 
accession into the WTO.  This was also further reduced to 
three years in the EU bilateral agreement with China.49  
Furthermore, China and the United States agreed to 49 
percent for foreign ownership in international and domestic 
land and sea (not mobile) services within six years and 49 
percent in most other services upon accession.  This would 
allow the Chinese government to maintain majority control. 
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Lastly, the deal called for the cap to be raised to 50 
percent after two years for value-added service and paging 
service.50 
E.   CHINA'S WIRELESS TELECOM COMMITMENTS  
More specifically, China made significant commitments 
toward its wireless telecom industry.  This is important 
because China's rapidly growing wireless telecom industry 
recently passed the United States as the largest mobile 
market in the world with over 200 million users.51  Now, 
foreign companies will be able to provide all analogue and 
digital cellular services and personal communications 
services through joint venture enterprises. 
Foreign companies were allowed to hold 25 percent 
foreign equity share when China first entered the WTO in 
December 2001.52  They were allowed 35 percent after one 
year and will be allowed 49 percent after three years.53  
This is two years faster than was provided for in the 
bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China because the 
European Union (EU) able to negotiate a two-year 
acceleration of this transition period. 
Foreign companies were allowed to provide services in 
and between Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou upon 
accession.54  Additionally, the list was expanded to 
Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Xian, Taiyuan 
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and Wuhan after one year.55  The area was further expanded 
nationwide after two years.  Again, the EU was able to 
negotiate immediate access to the Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou inter-city markets.  The U.S. bilateral agreement 
had specified only access to the intra-city markets. 
F.   WHAT WTO ACCESSION MEANS FOR CHINA 
Twenty-five years ago, the Chinese government 
initiated the step of introducing the market-based economy, 
allowing private enterprise to begin developing and making 
decisions on investment and production.  China's 
international trade responded at once.  By 1986, when China 
first applied to resume its membership in the GATT, exports 
had grown from 5 to 10 percent of China's GDP, and China 
accounted for about 1 percent of world exports.56  Trade had 
become a key factor in China's further economic growth and 
development. 
Nonetheless, the reform process was still at a 
relatively early stage.  Unless China had been able in 1986 
to undertake a massive transformation of its trade regime, 
it was doubtful that GATT membership at that time could 
have delivered its full economic benefits to China.57  A 
more profound and deeper phase of trade reform was needed 
to allow the rules-based multilateral trading system to 
play its key roles of guaranteeing China non-discriminatory 
market access abroad and access to cheaper imports at home. 
Since 1986, the process of trade reform has matured 
considerably, and China's trade performance has reflected 
this.  China's exports today account for over 20 percent of                     
55 Ibid. 
56 Eglin, Richard, "Challenges and Implications of China Joining the 
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its GDP, and China has become an emerging giant in 
international trade, accounting for over 3 percent of world 
exports.58  This trend is expected to rise in the future.   
This truly impressive reform process had to come from 
within China.  It could not have been imposed from the 
outside.  The WTO does not have supranational power; 
however, it can assist members to maintain the process of 
trade reform once the political direction has been set.  
This is the first and perhaps most important benefit the 
WTO accession will bring China. 
Additionally, accession will have a drastic impact on 
China's legal and administrative framework that protects 
private rights and private sector activity.  The Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
stipulate adequate protection to intellectual property 
rights so that the owners of these rights receive the 
benefits of their creativity and inventiveness.  The TRIPS 
Agreement covers all seven of the main areas of 
intellectual property: copyright, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of 
integrated circuits, trade secrets.59  In each area, it sets 
minimum standards of protection and requires governments to 
provide procedures and remedies so that these standards can 
be enforced.  Lastly, it provides an effective means of 
settling disputes between member governments.60 
Accession will also mean that China can replace the 
bilateral relationships it has used until now to shape its 
trade with major trading partners with a single, 
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multilateral trade relationship with the rest of the world.  
Bilateral relationships can be inconsistent and uncertain, 
thereby increasing risk for producers and investors.  It 
also requires a large amount of time, energy, and effort by 
government officials to negotiate and administer them.  
Therefore, the multilateral trade relationships will give 
China more stable access to foreign markets because it will 
reduce disruptions in foreign trade that are caused by 
unpredictable policy shifts.  Given this, China will be in 
a better position to attract foreign investors who use 
China as their export platform.  Additionally, it will also 
attract foreign investors who feel more secure about 
developing China's domestic market.  Regardless of whether 
export-oriented or attracted by China's huge domestic 
market, foreign direct investment (FDI) not only brings in 
additional capital but, more importantly, technology, 
market information, and global production and distribution 
networks that link China more tightly to the other 
economies.61 
The WTO rules will also protect China's rights against 
damaging protectionist policies in overseas markets.  
China's vulnerability to discriminatory protectionism in 
its major export markets has grown, along with China's 
success in increasing its exports over the past 20 years.62  
Were this to continue, and even perhaps escalate in the 
future if world economic growth were to suffer a serious 
decline, it could prove a major set-back to China's 
economic growth a development.  However, now that WTO 
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accession is complete, China's exporters will more 
confidently be able to make long-term business decisions.  
The more open the Chinese economy becomes, the more China 
will benefit from the legal security of the rules-based 
trading system.  
China's membership in the WTO will give it a very 
important voice in helping shape new WTO negotiations, to 
meet not only China's own needs for its future economic 
growth and development, but also the needs of other 
countries as well.  Naturally, each WTO member pursues its 
own export interests as vigorously as possible in a trade 
negotiation; however, the glue which holds the system 
together is the realization of each member that its export 
markets can only grow if producers abroad can increase 
their exports too.  Simply put, a country needs to open up 
its own market to higher imports if anything is ever to be 
gained.  China can expect to bring to the next WTO 
negotiation and reforming attitude that will make it a very 
important partner in helping the liberal trading system 
move forward. 
G.   CONCLUSION  
The WTO is one of the most important milestone in 
China's integration with the world and will a have profound 
impact on China's telecom industry.  The WTO guarantees 
globalization of the Chinese economy, the likes of which 
has never occurred in that country.  Additionally, China 
hopes the WTO will create an environment of mutual interest 
that provides for peaceful development that will have 
positive and significant influence on the development of 
Sino-U.S. relations.   With all the uncertainty of what the 
21 
WTO will bring to China, the one thing that is for sure is 
the WTO is going to have a large impact on China's wireless 
telecom industry.   
China made some major commitments regarding its 
telecom industry and wireless telecom industry.  These 
commitments marked China's first agreement to open its 
telecom sector to direct investment.  Currently, the 
commitments allow foreign companies to be eligible to own 
35 percent of the wireless telecom network nationwide.  
Starting in Dec 11, 2004, it will expand to 49 percent of 
the entire country.  However, just because China has agreed 
to open its wireless telecom industry to foreigners, it 
still must change its national laws and telecom policy to 
reflect its WTO commitments.               
The next chapter will look at China's telecom policy 
toward foreign involvement.  It will breakdown the history 
of Chinese telecom policy into five time periods to show 
the background and evolution of Chinese telecom policy 
toward foreign involvement.  It will display the dramatic 
and striking change in Chinese telecom policy from not 
allowing foreigners to invest in China's telecom to 



















































 III. CHINA'S TELECOM POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT 
 
 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was 
founded, China’s telecom network ownership has been under 
strict control.  For years, China’s policy makers have been 
very cautious about information and communication.  They 
have held a belief that telecom concerns the nation’s 
security and sovereignty; consequently, it cannot be opened 
to the outside world.  Therefore, direct foreign investment 
in telecom service had been explicitly prohibited.  The 
regulation of the former Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), now known as Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) since April 1998, clearly states 
that foreign direct investment in telecom is strictly 
banned: 
No organization and individuals outside China or 
solely foreign-funded enterprises, Sino-foreign 
joint ventures and cooperative businesses on the 
territory of China shall invest in, operate or 
participate in the operation of telecom services 
in China.63 
 
Additionally, the Chinese government has historically 
taken a conservative attitude toward foreign investment in 
telecom because Chinese sovereignty was viewed as 
vulnerable to outside challenge.  Furthermore, China has 
experienced sovereignty disputes involving confrontation 
with foreign companies that established unpleasant 
historical precedents.  These precedents cast a long 
shadow, greatly influencing policy of the Chinese 
government.  The result has been that the Chinese 
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government was reluctant for foreign companies to take any 
part in its telecom network. 
However, the Chinese government began to liberalize 
its telecom industry starting in the 1990s.64  Beijing knew 
it needed outside foreign investment in order to help 
finance the modernization and growth of China's telecom 
industry.  A sweeping change to Chinese telecom policy 
toward foreign involvement came when China signed its 1999 
bilateral WTO agreement with the United States, which 
cleared entry into the WTO for China in 2001.65  Prior to 
that agreement, China severely restricted sales of telecom 
service and barred foreign investment.  However, with this 
agreement, China will allow 49 percent foreign investment 
in all services, and allow 50 percent foreign ownership in 
other telecom services in as short as two years.  This was 
a 180-degree turn from Chinese policy a decade earlier.  
This chapter will now break down Chinese telecom 
policy into five time periods to show the background and 
evolution of Chinese telecom policy toward foreign 
involvement.  Particular emphasis is given to the pre-1949 
and post-1998 sections.  The pre-1949 section demonstrates 
that foreign companies' abuse of the Chinese telecom 
industry subsequently led to a xenophobic stance and ban on 
foreign involvement.  The post-1998 section demonstrates 
the dramatic change in Chinese telecom policy toward 
foreign involvement and the commitments China agreed to as 
part of the 1999 Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement. 
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B.   PRE-1949  
The 1870s marked the origin of telecommunications in 
China.66  Foreign companies effectively dominated the 
telecom sector due in large part to the undeveloped economy 
of China and its weak military position at the time.  These 
foreign companies effectively carved up China and divided 
the spoils amongst themselves.  The Chinese government was 
repeatedly taken advantage of and received the short end of 
the stick.  
In June 1871, the Danish Great Northern Telegraph 
Company (GNTC) constructed a 2,200-knot cable from 
Vladivostock via Nagasaki to Shanghai the first telegraph 
circuit in China.67  According to an agreement between 
Denmark, Britain, and Russia, the GNTC and the British 
Eastern Extension Australia and China Telegraph Company 
(EEACT) shared the rights of telecommunications provision 
in China from 1873 to 1899.68  Additionally, the coastal 
area north to Shanghai belonged to the GNTC, while the 
coastal area south to Hong Kong was under the control of 
the EEACT.  Both companies jointly controlled the coastal 
area between Shanghai and Hong Kong.  The GNTC and EEACT 
then attempted to restrict the rights of the Chinese 
government to establish its own submarine telegraph 
networks.  The GNTC presented a proposal to the Qing 
Dynasty government that claimed exclusive rights for 
providing telegraph services in the territories where it 
had installed submarine and land cables when China was 
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preparing to build such telegraph networks in June 1881.69  
Under the terms of this proposal, no other companies, 
including those from China, would be licensed to install 
cables in these areas in the ensuing twenty years.70  A weak 
Chinese state was confronted by a strong company that 
pointed a gun to its head and had no other choice but to 
accept the proposal. 
The GNTC and EEACT expanded their business in the name 
of repairing damaged circuits in 1900, when several Western 
countries raised arms against China to halt the Boxer 
Rebellion.  The Chinese Directorate General of Telegraphs 
was forced to sign a contract to pay the bill for repairing 
the Chinese Yantai-Dagu-Shanghai submarine cable, which was 
twice the actual cost for the repair service it did not 
order, and to give up all its rights to the two companies 
for thirty years before the bill was paid with 5 percent 
interest.71  Additionally, all of the previous contracts 
between the Qing government and the two companies were 
automatically extended to the end of 1930.72 
The GNTC and EEACT also proposed to the Qing 
government and obtained approval to repair the damaged 
Tianjin-Beijing land cable and agreed to return it to China 
after a peace agreement was reached.  The two companies, 
however, used this militarily important cable to bargain 
with the Qing government after the war and obtained the 
right to lease two other cables, namely the Beijing-Qiaketu 
cable to GNTC and the Beijing –Dagu cable to the EEACT, 
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before it returned the Tianjin-Beijing cable to China.73  In 
this way, China lost its control over international 
telecom, as the Beijing-Qiaketu cable was the gateway 
connecting China to Europe via Russia. 
The foreign companies also began telephone service in 
China.  The GNTC launched its telephone service in Shanghai 
on February 22, 1882.74  A British company, Shanghai Mutual 
Telephone Association, followed two months later.  Then in 
1883, another British company, the China and Japan 
Telephone Company, bought the GNTC’s network and 
consolidated it with that of the Mutual Telephone 
Association.75  The new company provided telephone service 
in Shanghai for 18 years until it failed in bidding against 
the Shanghai Mutual Telephone Company in 1900.76   
The Qing government gradually realized the importance 
of telecom.  The Qing government made efforts to the 
development of telegraph and telephone services.  A 
military telegraph circuit connecting Gaoxiong, Taipei, and 
Jilong in Taiwan was built in 1877 and was the first 
telegraph that was built independently by China.77  In 1879, 
a telegraph linking the office of the head of the Northern 
Navy in Tianjin with the Dagu and Beitang fortresses and 
the Tianjin weaponry factory was installed.78 In 1881, a 
telegraph circuit between Shanghai and Tianjin was 
constructed, becoming the first one to provide a public 
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telegraph service.79  By 1890, local telephone service was 
available in Beijing, Tianjin, and Nanjing.80 
Because of a lack of money, the Qing government 
adopted a policy of commercial operation under governmental 
supervision at the beginning of 1900.  The government 
established the Ministry of Posts and Transportation on 
November 6, 1901 as the administrative regulator, and the 
ministry began to nationalize the telecom industry.81  The 
new ministry had bought up all the commercial operations by 
the end of 1908.82  
In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and China 
entered an era of political instability which lasted until 
1949, when the Chinese Communist Party acceded to power.  
The period from 1911 to 1949 began with fighting between 
the Chinese warlords, followed by an 8-year invasion and 
occupation by Japan.  This was succeeded by civil wars 
between the Communist and Nationalist Parties.  This was a 
destructive period for the development of telecom in China.  
For example, the total number of local telephone 
subscribers dropped from 55,683 in 1936 to 7,918 in 1944, 
while the total length of long-distance circuits dropped 
from 52,245 km to 4,085 km during the same period.83 
As the foregoing suggested, the dominance of foreign 
companies set an unfortunate historical precedent from the 
1870s to 1949.  The historical precedent led to a highly 
conservative telecom policy on the part of the People's 
Republic of China.  Beijing viewed telecom as of critical 
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governmental and military importance.  The most important 
long-term policy consequence of the pre-1949 period of 
foreign domination was that it encouraged extreme 
reluctance to allow subsequent investment on the part of 
foreign companies.  Early negative experiences with foreign 
companies taught the Chinese that such companies were 
exploitative and threatened the sovereignty of the Chinese 
telecom system.  
C.   1949 TO 1978 
When the People's Republic of China was founded in 
1949, telecom facilities in China were outdated, and many 
had been damaged or destroyed during the war years.  There 
were only 20,000 telephones and 2,800 trunks for long-
distance telephone service throughout the entire country.84  
The infrastructure was also fragmented under the management 
of different interest groups.  The telecom systems lacked 
interoperability and compatibility and the entire telecom 
network was in anarchy. 
In November 1949, the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) was formally established and took 
over for the former Ministry of Posts and Transportation.85  
In September 1950, the MPT was restructured along the 
organizational model of the Soviet Union and existing 
facilities were repaired.86  Considerable progress was made 
toward establishing a long-distance telephone wire network 
connecting Beijing to provincial capitals with Soviet 
assistance.   
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However, growth in telecom halted with the general 
economic collapse after the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 
1960, but it revived in the 1960s after the telephone 
network was expanded and improved equipment was introduced, 
which included imports of Western plants.  Additionally, an 
important component of the fourth Five-Year Plan, which ran 
between 1971 and 1975 was a major development program for 
the telecom system.  The program allotted top priority to 
scarce electronics and construction resources and 
dramatically improved all aspects of China's telecom 
capabilities.87  During this period, all investment in 
telecom came mainly from the government.  Nevertheless, 
with the limited amount of money, the entire investment in 
telecom for these 31 years was just 6.4 billion RMB.88  
Additionally, due to the highly centralized planned 
economy, the telecom sector was operated with very low 
efficiency, poor technology, and the lowest telephone 
penetration rate among all Asia countries at 0.43 percent.89  
D.   1978 TO 1993  
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, a 
considerable amount of economic reforms occurred in the 
telecom sector.  The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party 
Congress in December 1978 focused on the Four 
Modernizations (industry, agriculture, defense, and 
science/technology).90  The MPT adopted a system to boost 
productivity and enterprise.  In 1982, the Chinese 
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government designated the telecom sector as one having 
strategic economic significance and granted the MPT 
preferential treatment in several areas.  
These preferential treatments subsidized the 
development of the MPT and the overall investment during 
this period reached 90.5 billion RMB.91  Financing during 
this period was diversified from pervious years.  Now 
sources of money consisted of internal funds, first 
installation fees, surcharges, and government investment.92  
Lastly, financing was obtained from a series of loans and 
credits from the World Bank and Asia Development Bank that 
vastly helped overall investment. 
E.   1994 TO 1998 
The development of the Chinese telecom industry 
underwent drastic changes during this period.  During this 
period, China saw several milestones in the liberalization 
and modernization of its telecom regulatory environment.  
First, there were great changes in taxation, fiscal and 
monetary regulations and the entire Chinese economy was 
developing into a market economy.  Second, China United 
Telecommunications Corporation (China Unicom) was 
established on July 19, 1994 as the second telecom carrier 
in China, competing with the China Telecom in the MPT.93  
After its creation, China Unicom was also licensed for 
international long-distance service and for the operation 
of a GSM mobile network which had been formerly controlled 
by China Telecom.  More importantly, it also gained the 
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right to construct and operate the CDMA network in China.94  
Third, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) declared that the Chinese telecom sector 
was economically viable and halted all international loans 
to China.95  Fourth, external funds were diminishing and 
there was less and less regional investment.  Now it was 
practically impossible to place surcharges on customers and 
installation fees were rapidly decreasing.96  Lastly, a 
major reorganization occurred when the MEI and MPT were 
merged to form the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
in April 1998.97  This helped provide a more complete 
separation of the regulatory function from the service 
provider.  The main function of the MII is to make laws and 
regulations and to act as a regulator through licensing 
approval, tariff oversight, service quality, maintenance of 
fair competition, and supervision of interconnection.98  
Faced with these increasingly tough situations in 
financing telecom development, China Telecom and China 
Unicom had to find new solutions.  Both companies looked 
for creative ways to bring in foreign investment.  The 
government's restrictions on foreign direct ownership 
greatly hindered the ability to attract outside funds.  One 
of the new strategies used by both of China's telecom 
operators was the use of deferred payment to vendors and 
leasing facilities.  This method became popular in 1996 to 
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1998.99  However, this method was not enough to facilitate 
the rapid expansion of the network. 
Therefore, in March 1997, China Telecom opened a 
branch in Hong Kong called China Telecom (HK).100  Its main 
function was to absorb foreign investment and reinvest it 
in the Chinese telecom market.  China Telecom (HK) was able 
to sell 2.6 billion shares in Asia, Europe, and North 
America, and was listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock 
markets.101  The capital collected was to be used for 
development of it mobile communications system in the 
coming years.  However, China Telecom (HK) needed to 
restructure its capital structure and management system 
according to international norms in order to meet 
requirements to sell shares in the New York stock market.  
The sale was a great success and provided China Telecom 
with considerable experience with attracting additional 
foreign capital in the future. 
China Unicom on the other hand chose a different 
approach to raise capital.  Its strategy during this period 
was called the China-China-Foreign (CCF) joint investment 
system.102  According to this system, a company owned by the 
local government or one of China Unicom's shareholders 
established a joint venture with foreign companies.  The 
objective of this joint venture was similar to the strategy 
of China Telecom (HK), which was to attract necessary 
investment funds.  It reinvested in the building of its 
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mobile communications infrastructure, leaving China Unicom 
responsible for operational management.  Cash flows are 
shared between the joint-venture and China Unicom according 
to an agreed ratio reached at the beginning of the 
agreement.  Therefore, China Unicom has bypassed the 
government restrictions on direct foreign ownership.  
Despite the formal ban, China Unicom has invested 1.5 
billion U.S. dollars in around 40 projects through the CCF 
scheme by April 1998.103 
However, the MII conducted a review of the CCF of 
China Unicom, and this system was banned in late 1998.104 
Therefore, China Unicom turned to the Bank of China and 
received generous loans totaling 5 billion RMB.105  This 
would solve the temporary cash requirement of China Unicom. 
However, its future development depended on whether or not 
the government would open the door for foreign investment. 
During this time, there were clear foreign ambitions 
to enter the public telecom network because of its great 
potential for return on investment.  The government's 
restriction of foreign direct ownership did not stop some 
foreign companies from trying.  An example of this is an 
early trial involving foreign telecom firms involving the 
offering of call-back service to China.106  The way the 
system worked was a resident of China would register his or 
her phone number with an overseas company.  Then the 
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resident would call the company, but only allow the phone 
to ring a few seconds, when the user wished to make an 
international call.  The company would then call the user 
back according to the caller's identity code, and the user 
would call the user back according to the caller's identity 
code and inform the company of the number with which he 
wished to be connected.  Since the call originated from 
foreign liberalized markets, the customer would save money.  
In this way, operators could make profits by exploiting the 
rate difference between MPT and key foreign firms, thereby 
competing with MPT through by-passing MPT's international 
network.107  However, this service met with a vigorous 
response from the MPT.  In May 1995, the Department of 
Telecommunications Administration of the MPT issued a 
statement banning call-back services.  The MPT announcement 
read: 
According to the policy of the Chinese 
government, international telecommunication 
service (in China) can only be provided by the 
MPT.  No individual or organization, including 
the reseller, can participate in international 
telecommunications service provision in any form.  
Recently, we found that certain foreign companies 
are advertising in China to provide call-back 
service.  This is a severe violation of China's 
regulations regarding international telecom 
services.  We solemnly announce that all resale 
of international service must stop.  Users of 
call back service should stop using that service 
immediately.  Otherwise, we will take necessary 
measures.108 
 
The MPT has successfully prevented foreign direct 
involvement in its telecom network.  One of the rationales 
to defend this policy, according to Wu Jichuan, former 




Minister of the MII, was the fact that the "posts and 
telecommunications service is closely connected with the 
country's political and social activities.  It is, 
therefore, related to the sovereign right of the state, and 
has to be centrally controlled."109  
F.  POST-1998   
However, since 1999, opportunities for foreign direct 
investment have significantly changed in China.  China has 
realized it can no longer go about the same path of 
restricting direct foreign investment because it can longer 
burden the expense of modernizing its telecom sector alone.  
Therefore, on 15 November 1999, after more than 13 years of 
negotiations, China and the United States signed a 
bilateral agreement which helped pave the way for China to 
join the WTO.110  
There were three main commitments China made as part 
of the preliminary deal between the United States and 
China.  These commitments marked China's first agreement to 
open its telecom sector to direct investment.  
Additionally, through these commitments, China will become 
a member of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA), 
which was originally reached in Geneva in February 1997 by 
69 countries to liberalize their telecom service markets 
for  competition.111   Tariffs  on  information  technology 
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products, such as computers, semiconductors and internet-
related equipment, will fall from the current 13.3 percent 
to zero by 2005.112 
The first commitment involved regulatory principles.  
It stated China agreed to implement the pro-competitive 
regulatory principles in the Basic Telecommunication 
Agreement and subsequent Annex A of the Reference Paper on 
Regulatory Principles113, and it agreed to technology-
neutral scheduling which allowed foreign suppliers to use 
any technology they choose to provide telecom services.114  
The second commitment involved the geographic scope of 
services.  China will now phase out all geographic 
restrictions for mobile telecom in three years.  
Additionally, China's key telecom services corridor in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which represents 
approximately 75 percent of all domestic traffic, will open 
immediately on accession in all telecom services.115   
The third and most important commitment involved 
investment.  Prior to the agreement, China did not allow 
foreign investment in telecom services.  However, according 
to the announced agreement, both parties agreed to set the 
foreign investment cap for operators at 49 percent for 
foreign ownership in mobile services within five years of 
accession into the WTO and further reduced to three years 
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with the E.U. bilateral agreement with China.116  
Furthermore, China and the United States agreed to 49 
percent for foreign ownership in international and domestic 
land and sea (not mobile) services within six years and 49 
percent in most other services upon accession.  This would 
allow the Chinese government to maintain majority control.  
Lastly, the deal called for the cap to be raised to 50 
percent after two years for value-added service and paging 
service.117 
China's entry into the WTO on December 11, 2001 has 
significant implications for the telecom sector.  First, 
and foremost, China now has the opportunity to receive 
plenty of investment for the telecom sector which is in 
drastic need of foreign direct investment.  The Chinese 
government will now be partly relieved of the heavy burden 
of investing in this capital-intensive industry.  It makes 
sense for the Chinese government to allow private and 
foreign investors to help pay for upgrading its telecom on 
this promising industry instead of continuously injecting 
billions of dollars which could be used elsewhere.  
Secondly, Chinese customers will benefit from enhanced 
competition in a variety of services.  So far, customers 
have already benefited by competition between China Telecom 
and China Unicom in the wireless telecom industry.  As a 
result, customers will enjoy more efficient and more 
economic services with the freedom to make choices.  
Foreign companies will further increase competition in the 
wireless telecom industry.    
Thirdly, China’s commitment to the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), which was discussed 




in the last chapter, will put the Chinese telecom 
regulatory system on the right track.  China recently 
published its first blanket provision over network 
interconnection.  It is very similar to the principles of 
the GATS and Reference Paper of the WTO which is based on 
the experience of such countries as the United Kingdom and 
the United States.118 
However, China's regulations and telecom policy were 
still not in line with the new commitments it was obligated 
to under WTO rules.  Therefore, China's MII, the country's 
key telecom regulatory body, submitted to the State Council 
the Telecommunications Regulation of the People's Republic 
of China, which contain 11 chapters and 82 articles of 
regulation.119  Once the State Council approved them on 
September 20, 2000, they became China's first comprehensive 
set of telecom regulations.  MII drafted the regulations 
with the goal to making them compatible with the rules of 
the WTO.  
Now, for the first time, foreign participation in 
China's telecom services market is allowed under Chinese 
regulations.  Foreign investors have to set up joint 
ventures with Chinese companies and can only be a minority 
party in the joint venture, according to a separate but 
related document drafted by MII entitled "Regulations on 
Foreign Invested Telecommunications Enterprises."120  The 
chairman of the Board of Directors must be appointed and 
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the general manager must be recommended by the Chinese 
investor. Foreign companies must also demonstrate "sound 
performance and experience in the industry," which will 
give Chinese authorities great flexibility in deciding 
which company should receive licenses.121 
Unbelievably, despite the recent regulations from the 
MII, the National People's Congress has yet to pass a 
comprehensive and workable telecom law.  China has been 
working on a telecom law for over 20 years.122  Bureaucratic 
competition among the various companies in China's telecom 
industry has stalled efforts to finalize a draft.  As a 
result, China's telecom industry has been governed by 
pieced-together administrative regulations. 
MII and China's legislators should gain valuable 
experience through the implementation of the previous 
Telecom Regulations.  This will allow the adoption of a 
comprehensive and workable telecom law by the National 
People's Congress.  The MII stated in March 2001 that the 
law should be available within two to four years.123  Most 
likely, the long-awaited telecom law will likely be based 
heavily on the Telecom Regulations. 
G.   CONCLUSION  
Chinese telecom policy toward foreign involvement has 
changed considerably in recent years.  Clearly, China's 
telecom policy has come a long way, from not allowing 
foreign investment to allowing up to 50 percent foreign 
investment in some areas.  Chinese telecom policy mirrors 
                    
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, pg 41. 
123 Ibid.  
41 
developments in the wider society, and telecom policy 
outcomes reflect the huge liberalizing changes coming from 
within the society.  
Increased demand for telecom services and the need to 
modernize its outdated infrastructure drove China to 
rethink the policy of allowing foreign investors own part 
of the telecom network.  However, in the end, the increased 
financing, investment and the new technology China would 
gain from the new policy outweighed the disadvantages.  
However, there are still many Chinese who are still 
skeptical about the change for national security reasons, 
especially because of the history China has had with 
mistreatment and subjugation by foreign powers.     
The question now is, who will take advantage of this 
change in telecom policy?  China's 1.3 billion population 
has appeared to be a lucrative market for U.S. investors.  
There will no doubt be intense competition to see who will 
eventually become the industry leader in the wireless 
telecom industry.  The next chapter will address which U.S. 
companies will be affected most and will explore if the 
American wireless telecom industry will benefit from 







































IV.  EFFECTS ON U.S. WIRELESS TELECOM INDUSTRY  
 
A.   INTRODUCTION  
In 2002, China passed the United States to become the 
largest wireless telephone industry in the world, with over 
200 million mobile phone subscribers among a population of 
over 1.3 billion.124  Today, there are over 230 million 
mobile phone subscribers in China125, and analysts predict 
that China's wireless telephone industry will eventually be 
twice the size of those in Europe and the United States 
combined.  Additionally, China's Ministry of Information 
Industry predicts that China will have over 400 million 
subscribers by the end of 2005.126 
Studies have also shown that the number of mobile 
phone subscribers will exceed that of fixed-line telephone 
users sometime before 2004.127  Wireless networks have been 
successful in China, as other parts of Asia and other 
developing countries, because of the fact that they can be 
installed more quickly and at a lower price per subscriber 
than fixed-line systems.  Additionally, an estimated 40 
percent of Chinese villages are not connected by the 
country's fixed-line network.128 
The question that remains is who will capitalize on 
China's vast opportunity in the wireless telecom industry?  
Since, China became a full member of the WTO in December 
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2001 and opened its telecom industry up to the rest of the 
world it has seen dramatic changes.  There are several U.S. 
wireless telecom companies which attempting to benefit from 
a more open China with respect to its telecom industry. 
This chapter first provides some background 
information on China's four wireless companies that have a 
license from the Chinese government to operate mobile 
telephones.  Next, this chapter discusses the different 
third generation (3G) technologies that the MII is looking 
to employ in China's wireless telecom future.  This will 
have a major impact on which United States companies, if 
any, will benefit from the important future decision.  The 
last section of this chapter explores which U.S. companies 
have been receiving contracts and making joint ventures 
with China's wireless telecom companies in the period from 
December 2001 to June 2003.  
B.  BACKGROUND ON CHINA'S WIRELESS COMPANIES 
There are currently four wireless companies that have 
a license to operate a wireless telephone network from the 
Chinese government: China Mobile Communication Corporation 
(China Mobile), China United Telecommunication Corp (China 
Unicom), China Telecommunications Corporation (China 
Telecom), China Netcom Group.129  China Mobile recently 
dethroned United Kingdom's wireless giant Vodafone as the 
world's largest mobile phone carrier in September 2002, 
with over 123 million users.130  China Unicom is currently 
the world's third largest mobile phone carrier, with over 
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107 million users.131  China Telecom, once the nation's 
monopoly provider of fixed-line local and long distance 
phone service, now operates mobile phone networks in 21 
provinces in the south and west.  Lastly, its newly created 
competitor, China Netcom, operates mobile networks in 10 
provinces in northern China. 
In 1999, the Chinese government decided to split the 
state-owned monopoly telecom service provider China Telecom 
into four pieces to promote greater competition in the 
domestic telecom sector and prepare its telecom industry 
for the impact of China's entry into the WTO.  Each of the 
four companies was chartered to concentrate on a different 
telecom sector.  The first company kept the name China 
Telecom and concentrated on the fixed-line telephone 
industry.  China Mobile, the second company, concentrated 
on the wireless telecom industry.  China Satellite 
Transmission (ChinaSat) and Guoxin Paging were the last two 
companies created and concentrated on the satellite and 
paging industry, respectively. 
Therefore, China Mobile, formerly a subsidiary and the 
most profitable arm of China Telecom, was officially 
introduced to the world as its own entity in 1999.  The GSM 
(Global System for Mobile Communications) technology that 
was first developed in Europe in the early 1980s was the 
primary standard it used for its mobile phone telecoms.  
China Mobile currently boasts more than 123 million users 
that represent over 70 percent of the Chinese wireless 
telecom industry, which not only makes it China's largest 
wireless telecom provider but also the world's largest 
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wireless operator.132  Ironically, Vodafone purchased a 2.1 
percent stake in China Mobile in Oct 2000 for $3.7 
billion.133  
China Unicom was established in 1994 by the former 
Ministry of Electronics (MoE), the Ministry of Electronic 
Power and the Ministry of Railway as a competitor to China 
Telecom, which was then owned by the former Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT).  Currently, China 
Unicom is the second largest wireless telecom operator in 
China with over 107 million users that represent a little 
under 30 percent of the Chinese wireless telecom 
industry.134 
China Unicom offers a full range of telecommunication 
services, such as wireless, paging, long distance, 
satellite, and data and Internet services.  However, it 
receives its primary revenue from the wireless telecom 
industry.  China Unicom announced in late 2001 that it 
started a new wireless network based on code division 
multiple access (CDMA) technology.135  This was in addition 
to its other wireless network based on GSM technology.  The 
CDMA network was an attempt to bring a higher quality 
signal to China and to take wireless phone subscribers away 
from bigger rival China Mobile.136  It has been successful 
and has allowed China Unicom to cut into China Mobile's 
market share in the last couple of years.  Additionally, 
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China Unicom enjoys a preferential policy that enables it 
to charge 10 percent less than China Mobile for its 
services.137  The price advantage also helped attract many 
new GSM subscribers away from China Mobile.  China Unicom 
aims to have 150 million mobile subscribers by 2005, with 
over half of these users anticipated to be CDMA users.138  
China Telecom was again split in May 2002 along 
geographic lines.  In 1999, the Chinese government stripped 
away the wireless, paging, and satellite business from 
Telecom and made the company primarily a monopoly of fixed-
line telephone networks and services.  This time 30 percent 
of its network resources and ten subsidiaries in northern 
China were merged into China Netcom Group.139  The remaining 
21 subsidiaries in southern China retained 70 percent of 
the networks and formed the new China Telecom Group.140  
Though the primary charter for China Netcom and China 
Telecom is to operate fixed-line telephones in China, the 
Chinese government has also granted both companies licenses 
to operate wireless networks in China to further increase 
the competition.   
Both China Telecom and China Netcom have been using a 
wireless technology developed by UTStarcom, based in 
Alameda, California, called personal access system (PAS) to 
extend their services.141  The technology was primarily 
introduced into China's rural area as a supplement to 
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fixed-line systems.  Marketed as a low-cost investment 
option for wireless local telephone service, the PAS system 
features advanced voice and data services within a flexible 
network architecture that can be seamlessly integrated with 
future 3G and broadband technologies.  With this 
technology, China Telecom and China Netcom have signed up 
over 13 million Chinese consumers.142 
C.   THIRD GENERATION (3G) STANDARDS 
3G stands for third generation and is a wireless 
industry term for a collection of international standards 
and technologies aimed at increasing efficiency and 
improving the performance of mobile wireless networks.  3G 
wireless services offer enhancements to current 
applications, including greater data speeds, increased 
capacity for voice and data, and the advent of packet data 
networks versus today’s switched networks. As second-
generation (2G) wireless networks evolve into third-
generation systems around the globe, operators are working 
hard to enable 2G and 3G compatibility. 
3G is a generic term covering a range of future 
wireless network technologies.  There are several 3G 
technologies available, but the most popular and the ones 
China is looking to employ include WCDMA, CDMA2000, and TD-
SCDMA.143  Despite any benefits that either system has over 
the other, the author does not foresee any major service 
provider of GSM switching to CDMA2000 or an IS-95 provider 
switching to TD-SCMA or WCDMA.  The cost of installing or 
replacing an entire base station is too much, considering 
that most base stations are relatively new.  More than 
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likely, the service provider will chose a 3G cellular 
system that provides some backward compatibility for their 
current customers and equipment. 
The current hot topic in China's wireless industry is 
3G licenses.  The Chinese government remains undecided 
regarding which 3G technology it will adopt as a national 
standard.144  China will not start issuing 3G mobile 
licenses until 2004 or 2005 because the industry and 
network standards are still immature.145  3G mobile networks 
would not start replacing existing mobile communications 
until 2006.146   
There are three 3G standards China is currently 
looking to employ.  The first is wideband CDMA (W-CDMA, a 
GSM development), which is a version developed and 
primarily used in Europe.  The second is CDMA2000, which is 
a version developed in the United States by San Diego based 
Qualcomm.  Lastly, the China Academy of Telecommunications 
Technology (CATT) forged a joint venture with Germany's 
Siemens and developed a domestic 3G digital mobile network 
based on time division-synchronous CDMA (TD-SCDMA) 
technology.  
CATT officials argue that the country should adopt TD-
SCDMA as the national 3G standard to avoid becoming a 
battlefield for overseas companies.147  Furthermore, TD-
SCDMA adheres to international standards and has been 
approved by the International Telecommunications Union.  
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The Chinese government, conscious of its huge market and 
loath to pay royalties to foreign companies, continues to 
invest in TD-SCDMA technology and will continue to 
aggressively promote its use as the future 3G standard for 
China.    
Chinese officials responsible for planning the release 
of 3G wireless networks in China have submitted three 
options to Beijing for consideration.  The first proposal 
would allow operators total freedom to deploy any 3G 
standard.  The second recommendation would see China 
Telecom and China Netcom being awarded licenses for the 
Chinese TD-SCDMA technology.  China Mobile would then 
deploy W-CDMA and China Unicom to implement CDMA2000.  In 
the final option, China Telecom and China Netcom are 
restricted to just one standard but would still need to 
deploy TD-SCDMA in certain districts as the main network 
system.148   
However, the first option is not expected to be 
chosen, since the Chinese have already invested over $55 
million in developing the domestic TD-SCDMA standard and 
would want some operators to adopt the technology.149  China 
Mobile has already indicated plans to migrate from GSM to 
W-CDMA.150  The company plans on rolling out its W-CDMA 
network as soon as 3G licenses are awarded.  China Unicom 
has also chosen not to adopt the TD-SCDMA standard and has 
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chosen to upgrade its CDMA network to a CDMA 2000 network, 
instead.151  Therefore, most likely China Telecom and China 
Netcom will be forced to deploy the TD-SCDMA in some 
capacity.  The MII is expected to provide some financial 
incentives for the licensed companies to build their TD-
SCDMA networks. 
D.  WIRELESS CONTRACTS WITH AMERICAN COMPANIES 
China has become an extremely competitive market for 
the world's largest telecommunication companies.  There are 
over 50 foreign companies that are involved in some form 
with telecommunication operations in China.  However, this 
thesis concentrates only on the United States companies 
involved in some form in China's wireless 
telecommunications.   
Demand for wireless telecom equipment exceeds China's 
production capabilities, resulting in increasing demand for 
imports and foreign investment in manufacturing.  Until 
recently, profits have largely been limited to fees rather 
than revenues.  However, since China joined the WTO, 
foreign companies can now form joint ventures with Chinese 
companies.   
There have been several joint ventures established 
between United States companies and the four Chinese 
companies that have licenses to operate wireless 
telephones.  A complete list of contacts, joint ventures, 
and agreements signed between United States companies and 
Chinese companies from Jan 2002 to July 2003 is appended as 
Table 1 at the end of this chapter.  There have been a 
total of 39 contracts, joint ventures, or agreements signed 
with United States companies during that time frame, valued                     
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over $2 billion.  However, in reality, there were probably 
some contracts that were not made public, and so the total 
value of the contracts could be double the above value 
since some of the contracts did not disclose or estimate a 
value of the contract.  Additionally, these contracts only 
represent only a fraction of the contracts awarded 
worldwide.  Alcatel, Ericsson, Hauwei, NEC, Nokia, Nortel, 
Samsung, Siemens, and many other foreign companies have all 
received substantial contracts from China Mobile, China 
Unicom, China Netcom, and China Telecom. 
The U.S. company that has probably benefited the most 
from the new WTO regulations allowing joint ventures is 
Qualcomm Incorporated, based in San Diego, California.  The 
company pioneered the commercialization of the CDMA 
technology used in wireless communications equipment.152  
The company owns many patents to CDMA technology.  It not 
only makes money on the sale of its wireless phone chips 
and CDMA equipment, but it also gets royalty revenue any 
time its technology is used.153 
Qualcomm and China Unicom formed a 50:50 joint venture 
that would foster growth of Qualcomm's Binary Runtime 
Environment for Wireless (BREW) platform in China.  The 
companies said that the joint venture would "capitalize on 
the technical advantages of BREW technology, the 
competitive advantages of CDMA in wireless data and the 
versatile operating capabilities of China Unicom."154  There 
was no public dollar amount placed on the value of the 
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joint venture, but it could earn millions of dollars for 
Qualcomm in the future if the technology proves successful. 
The first joint venture between an American company 
and a Chinese company after China officially joined the WTO 
came on May 28, 2002, with a joint venture between Openwave 
Systems and China Unicom.155  The modest joint venture 
between the companies was to develop mobile communications 
technology software and was estimated to be worth $10 
million.  American 3 Com and Chinese Huawei Technologies 
also signed a 49:51 joint venture on March 20, 2003 worth 
an estimated $19.3 million.156  3 Com was to help 
manufacture wireless data communications equipment in Hong 
Kong and Hangzhou.  The most recent joint venture was a 
49:51 wireless collaboration project between American LCC 
International and Chinese Bright Oceans for an undisclosed 
amount for a wireless collaboration project on July 24, 
2004.157 
However, one of the most lucrative joint ventures is 
between Alameda, California-based UTStarcom and Chinese 
Datang Mobile.158  Datang Mobile was incorporated as a 
limited liability company under the laws of China in 
February 2002 and aspires to become a leading supplier of 
TD-SCDMA technology and network solutions in China and 
throughout the world.  There was not any estimated value 
given for the joint venture, but both companies are to 
collaborate to provide a TD-SCDMA solution using an IP-
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based core network.  If China decides to use the TD-SCDMA 
technology as the future of its 3G technology, then 
UTStarcom would benefit greatly from this joint venture. 
UTStarcom demonstrates that a company does not have to 
deal in CDMA or GSM technologies to capitalize on the 
wireless growth in China.  It has been awarded over $432.8 
million in supply and equipment contracts between Jan 2002 
to July 2003.159  The contacts have been with fixed-line 
operators China Telecom and China Netcom to deploy its 
Personal Access System (PAS) Internet protocol (IP) based 
wireless technology.  China Telecom and China Netcom are 
using the PAS to extend, in a manner similar to wireless 
local loops, voice and data services from their fix-line 
infrastructures to mobile and desktop devices.  This 
technology has been especially successful in rural areas in 
China where China Mobile and China Unicom's wireless 
service does not have coverage.  The service has allowed 
China Netcom and China Unicom to cut into China Mobile and 
China Unicom new subscribers by offering a wireless service 
at drastically lower prices than the traditional wireless 
telephone companies. 
Motorola is another American company that has done 
well in China's wireless telecommunications industry.  
Although it has not establish any joint ventures during the 
year and half following China's entry into the WTO, it had 
already established several joint ventures with Chinese 
companies to produce cell phones, CDMA equipment, 
semiconductors, and other wireless high-tech products.  
Currently, Motorola's facilities in China include a wholly-
owned company, a holding company, nine joint ventures and 
                    
159 See Table 1. 
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24 subsidiaries.160  Additionally, it currently employs more 
than 12,000 employees in China.  Motorola's nine joint 
ventures in China include: Guangzhou Jinpeng Cellular 
Systems Company, Shanghai Motorola Telecom Products 
Company, Beijing Huamin Smartcard System Manufacturing 
Company, Hangzhou Eastcom Cellular Phone Company, Leshan-
Phoenix Semiconductor Company, Huamin Smartcard Systems 
Company, Hangzhou Eastcom Cellular Equipment Company, 
Shanghai Zhongmei Automotive Electronics Company, Motorola 
Qiangxin (Tianjin) IC Design Company.161     
Motorola entered the Chinese market in 1987 when it 
opened a representative office in Beijing.  In 1992, 
Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd, was established in 
Tianjin, where it primarily manufactures mobile phones and 
wireless communications equipment for the Chinese market 
and other markets in the world.  Motorola is China's 
largest foreign investor, with more than $3.45 billion in 
cumulative investment in China.  Additionally, Motorola has 
stated that it is going to invest an additional $6.6 
billion in China over the next five years and double the 
annual production of its Chinese subsidiary and joint 
ventures.162  Recently, Motorola announced that it is going 
to back the Chinese TD-SCDMA mobile standard and invest 
heavily in the technology to give it a foothold in the 
market if the Chinese government decides to use it for its 
3G  standard.163  Over  the period of Jan 2002 to July 2003, 
                    
160 Motorola Homepage, http://www.motorola.com.cn; Internet; accessed 
15 August 03. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 "Motorola to invest in Chinese TD-SCDMA 3G Standard," available 
from: http://www.3gnewsroom.com/3g_news/jan_03/news_2926.shtml; 
Internet; accessed 17 August 2003.  
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Motorola received over $616.8 million in equipment 
contracts to expand and upgrade China's GSM wireless 
networks.164 
Lucent Technologies is another giant in China's 
wireless telecommunication industry.  Currently, it has 
seven regional offices, six joint ventures, three wholly-
owned companies, two Bell Labs branches (Beijing and 
Shanghai), and four R&D centers.165  Additionally, it 
currently employs more than 4,000 employees in China.  
Lucent's six joint ventures in China include: Guoxin Lucent 
Technologies Network Technologies Company (Shanghai), 
Lucent Technologies Qingdao Telecommunications System 
Company, Lucent Technologies Qingdao Telecommunications 
Systems Services Company, Lucent Technologies Optical 
Networks (Shanghai), Lucent Technologies Information and 
Communications of Shanghai Company, Lucent Technologies 
Qingdao Telecom Enterprise.166  
Lucent made a significant entry in China in 1993 when 
it signed a memorandum of understanding with the State 
Development Planning Commission for long-term, multi-field 
cooperation in China.  Lucent's strongest areas in China 
include long-haul transmission and wireless infrastructure 
markets.  Over the period of Jan 2002 and July 2003, Lucent 
received over $400 million in equipment contracts to 
provide CDMA equipment upgrades in China.167 
There are several other American companies that would 
like to enter the Chinese wireless telecommunications 
market.  Software vendors like IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett                     
164 See Table 1. 
165 Lucent Homepage, http://www.lucent.com; Internet; accessed 16 
August 03.  
166 Email from Eric Xu from Lucent Technologies dated 8 September 
2003. 
167 See Table 1. 
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Packard have all been trying to gain entry into China's 
wireless industry in some form.168  Microsoft has stated 
that it is willing to invest for years without reward to 
win over China.  Currently, Microsoft is competing with 
Britain's Symbian to become the standard software used in 
new wireless phones.  China's second largest mobile handset 
maker, TCL Mobile, started using Microsoft's mobile 
software standard in its mobile phones in May 2002.169  TCL 
is one of China's fastest growing handset makers and has 
been steadily winning market share over other mobile 
handset makers the past several years. 
Compaq, Intel, AsiaInfo, Calypso Wireless, Tectronix, 
and LCC International have all signed significant wireless 
supply and equipment contracts with Chinese companies the 
past several years.170  Contracts were made for providing 
software and services for wireless IP network expansion. 
Other contracts were for developing wireless local area 
network hotspots in urban public areas.  Additionally, 
collaborating in various wireless projects and developing 
TD-SCDMA technology proved to be popular types of 
contracts.  Whatever the contract, joint venture, or 
agreement, there seems to be no end in sight to the 
billions of dollars Chinese companies are willing to give 
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E.  CONCLUSION  
Qualcomm, UTStarcom, Motorola, and Lucent Technologies 
are the American wireless telecom companies that have 
benefited the most from China joining the WTO.  This 
analysis is based on supply and equipment contracts, along 
with joint ventures, that the companies made with Chinese 
wireless companies.  Additionally, Openwave Systems, 3 Com, 
and LCC International have all entered into joint ventures 
with Chinese wireless firms that will prove to be 
beneficial in the future. 
However, it is surprising that more American wireless 
telecom companies have not entered into more joint ventures 
with Chinese firms.  Less than two years after China's 
admission to the WTO, the widely anticipated "foreign 
invasion" has not happened due partly to the severe 
downturn in the telecom industry and concerns over Chinese 
regulations and returns for foreign investment.  There were 
only five joint ventures between American wireless 
companies and Chinese firms from January 2002 to July 2003.  
Additionally, even though Motorola and Lucent already had 
several joint ventures in place before China joined the 
WTO, both companies have not established any new joint 
ventures since.  
Many American wireless companies are waiting to see 
which direction China is heading for its future 3G wireless 
standard.  An announcement is expected by the end of this 
year or early next year which 3G wireless standard China is 
going to use.  However, most likely, the Chinese government 
will issue licenses for three different 3G standards.  
China Unicom with most likely adopt CDMA2000 as its future 
3G standard due to backward compatibility issues.  
Additionally, China Mobile will probably adopt W-CDMA for 
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the same reasons.  Nevertheless, the Chinese government has 
invested millions of dollars into its own domestic 3G 
standard, TD-SCDMA; therefore, some Chinese wireless 
company will likely receive a license to operate it.  
China has the world's largest cellular networks market 
in the world and continues to increase its lead.  
Additionally, only 16.2 percent of the population owns a 
wireless phone, so there is still plenty of room for 
growth.171  During 2002, an average of five million new 
wireless subscribers were added monthly.172  There is no 
wonder why so many foreign wireless companies want to try 
and enter this promising market.    

















                    
171 The MII Homepage, http://www.mii.gov.cn; Internet; accessed 15 
August 03.  
172 Cai, Michael, "The Chinese Telecom Market Still Promises 
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Date Type  U.S. Company Chinese Company Amount Description 
4-Mar-02 Equipment contract AsiaInfo China Mobile $3.9m 
Provide Software and 
Services for wireless IP 
network expansion  
6-Mar-02 Equipment contract Motorola China Unicom $260m 
Expand and upgrade GSM 
wireless networks in five 
provinces. 
28-Mar-02 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $115m 
Deploy Personal Access 
System (PAS) IP based 
wireless technology around 
China 
17-May-02 Equipment contract AsiaInfo China Mobile $1.5m 
Provide Software and 
Services for wireless IP 
network expansion  
28-May-02 Joint Venture Openwave Systems  China Unicom $10m 
JV to develop mobile comm 
technology software 
19-Jun-02 Equipment contract Motorola China Mobile $100.8m 
Expand and upgrade GSM 
wireless networks in Hubei, 
Yunnan, Beijing and Tianjin 
11-Jul-02 Supply Contract P-Com Shanhai Datang Mobile $100m 
Provide spread spectrum, 
point-to-point & point-to-
multipoint products  
24-Jul-02 Equipment contract UTStarcom China Netcom $18.7m 
Provide IP-based wireless 
access system 
2-Aug-02 Equipment contract Motorola China Mobile $108m 
Expand and upgrade GSM 
wireless networks in Hubei, 
Yunnan, Beijing and Tianjin 
5-Aug-02 Equipment contract AsiaInfo China Unicom # 
Expand and upgrade 
wireless data networks in 
Ningxia and Qinghai 
provinces, & Hainan and 
Beijing 
24-Sep-02 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $22m 
Provide IP-based wireless 
access system in Southern 
China 
26-Sep-02 Letter of Intent INTAC International China Unicom # 
Become authorized reseller 
of wireless mobile services in 
Chengdu branch of China 
Unicom 
4-Oct-02 Supply Contract AsiaInfo China Telecom # 
Build metropolitan area 
wireless network in Beijing 
21-Oct-02 Equipment contract Lucent Technologies  China Unicom $400m 
Provide CDMA 1x equipment 
upgrade 
15-Nov-02 Equipment contract Motorola China Mobile $68m Upgrade GSM and GPRS 
networks 
19-Nov-02 Supply Contract Motorola TCL Mobile Comms  # 
Provide platforms for 
developing next-generation 
handsets in Qingdao 
21-Nov-02 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Netcom $61m 
Provide IP-based wireless 
access system in Northern 
China 
26-Nov-02 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $31.7m 
Provide IP-based wireless 
access system in Jiangsu 
29-Nov-02 Joint Venture UTStarcom Datang Mobile # 
Provide a TD-SCDMA 
solution using IP-based core 
network  
8-Feb-03 Supply Contract Calypso Wireless China Telecom $500m 
Delivery of broadboand 
video mobiles phones over 
three years 
13-Feb-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $26.50 
Supply PAS gear for local 
wireless service 
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Date Type  U.S. Company Chinese Company Amount Description 
3-Mar-03 Joint Venture (50:50) Qualcomm China Unicom # 
JV to develop CDMA 
services in China using 
Qualcomm's BREW tech 
5-Mar-03 Equipment contract Lucent Technologies  China Telecom # 
Build city wireless system 
networks in Jiangsu province
10-Mar-03 Equipment Contract Lucent Technologies  China Telecom # 
Build city wireless system 
networks in Fujian province 
10-Mar-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Netcom $50m 
Supply PAS gear for local 
wireless service in Northern 
China 
10-Mar-03 Agreement Signed Intel  China Netcom/Mobile # 
Develop wireless local area 
network hotspots in urban 
public areas  
14-Mar-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $30m 
Supply PAS gear for local 
wireless service in Guizhou 
19-Mar-03 Agreement Signed Tectronix  Datang Telecom Tech # 
Collaborate in developing 
TD-SCDMA technology 
20-Mar-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Netcom # 
Provide IP-DSLAM 
multimedia mobile platform 
in Shandong and Shanxi 
20-Mar-03 Joint Venture (49:51) 3Com Huawei Technologies $19.3m 
JV to manufacture data 
comm equipment in Hong 
Kong and Hangzhou 
22-May-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom $20m Supply PAS gear in 
Guangdong 
23-May-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Netcom $57.9m Provide PAS equipment in Beijing 
28-May-03 Supply Contract Lucent Technologies  China Unicom # 
Provide support software 
long-hual wireless switch 
network 
15-Jun-03 Equipment contract Lucent Technologies  Hunan Unicom # 
Provincial back-bone 
transport network for its 
mobile network 
15-Jun-03 Agreement Signed Lucent Technologies  Unicom Horizon Mobile # Technical Services 
15-Jul-03 Equipment contract Motorola China Unicom $80m 
Phase 3 expansion of 
CDMA2000 network 
16-Jul-03 Supply Contract SnapTrack/Motorola China Unicom # Supply Wireless Gear 
23-Jul-03 Supply Contract UTStarcom China Telecom # 
Supply PAS gear for local 
wireless service in China 
24-Jul-03 Joint Venture (49:51) LCC International  Bright Oceans  # Wireless Collaboration 
Project 
      
Total 39 Contracts, JV, or Agreements Signed   2,084.3 m  
    # = Undisclosed Value (in millions) 
      
      
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, rcrnews.com, and various newspaper and magazine articles  
 
Table 1. Contracts, Joint Ventures, and Agreements signed 
between China and U.S. wireless companies from 1 January 02 
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V.  CONCLUSION AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A.   SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis first covered China's long entry into the 
WTO.  It showed that the WTO is one of the most important 
milestones in China's integration with the world and will a 
have profound impact on China's wireless telecom industry.  
The WTO guarantees globalization of the Chinese economy, 
the likes of which has never occurred in that country.  
Additionally, China hopes the WTO will create an 
environment of mutual interest that provides for peaceful 
development and that will also have positive and 
significant influence on the development of Sino-U.S. 
relations.  With all the uncertainty over what the WTO will 
bring to China, the one thing for sure is that the WTO is 
going to have a large impact on China's wireless telecom 
industry.   
China has made some major commitments regarding its 
telecom industry and wireless telecom industry.  These 
commitments marked China's first agreement to open its 
telecom sector to direct investment.  Foreign companies 
were allowed to hold 25 percent foreign equity share when 
China first entered the WTO in December 2001.  They were 
allowed 35 percent after one year and will be allowed 49 
percent after three years.  This is two years faster than 
was provided for in the bilateral agreement between the 
U.S. and China because the European Union (EU) able to 
negotiate a two-year acceleration of this transition 
period. 
Additionally, Chinese telecom policy toward foreign 
involvement has changed considerably in recent years to 
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reflect its WTO commitments.  Clearly, China's telecom 
policy has come a long way, from not allowing foreign 
investment to allowing up to 50 percent foreign investment 
in some areas.  Chinese telecom policy mirrors developments 
in the wider society, and telecom policy outcomes reflect 
the huge liberalizing changes coming from within the 
society.  
Increased demand for telecom services and the need to 
modernize its outdated infrastructure drove China to 
rethink the policy of allowing foreign investors own part 
of the telecom network.  However, in the end, the increased 
financing, investment and the new technology China would 
gain from the new policy outweighed the disadvantages.  
However, there are still many Chinese who remain skeptical 
about the change for national security reasons, especially 
because of the history China has had with mistreatment and 
subjugation by foreign powers. 
B.  SECURITY IMPLICATIONS  
There are many people in China who have concerns that  
China’s national security might be threatened by allowing 
foreign direct investment in their network.  That is, 
foreign ownership of telecommunications facilities might 
allow state secrets to leak out of China.  Additionally, 
the telecommunications infrastructure might escape national 
control during a national emergency, such as a war. 
However, concerns that national security will be 
threatened by foreign direct investment are greatly 
exaggerated.  First, no foreign company will be able to own 
its own independent wireless telecommunication network in 
China.  It simply is not cost effective for a foreign 
company to develop its own infrastructure to operate its 
own telecommunication network in China.  Therefore, the 
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best a foreign company can do is establish joint ventures 
with Chinese companies.  Yet, by Chinese regulations, 
foreign companies can only control a maximum of 50 percent 
in those joint ventures, and can only be a minority party 
in those operations.   
Additionally, experience in the United States shows 
ownership of telecommunications infrastructure is not a 
foolproof method of safeguarding state secrets.  In Section 
310(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1934, foreign 
ownership and operation of the American radio systems were 
strictly controlled.  However, it did not stop Japanese 
diplomats from transmitting encoded messages about the 
imminent attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 from the United 
States to Tokyo over facilities operated by American-owned 
telegraph carriers.  The most effective way to protect 
national secrets is to properly protect the information 
resource rather than the transmission instrument.  
Therefore, encrypting the data is a much more effective way 
to protect national security. 
C.   RESEARCH ANSWERS 
The primary research question of this thesis is 
whether the U.S. wireless telecom industry has benefited 
from China entering the WTO.  Even though it has been less 
than two years since China joined the WTO, it is safe to 
say that both China and the United States have benefited.  
China is updating and expanding its wireless 
telecommunication networks and is very much benefiting from 
the advanced technology it is receiving from foreign 
companies.  The United States is receiving supply and 
equipment contracts worth billions of dollars.  
Additionally, the United States has received several 
lucrative joint ventures with Chinese companies since 
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China's accession into the WTO and many more will be made 
once China decides on its future 3G standard.  This 
translates directly into jobs for the American economy.  
The market in China now accounts for over a quarter of 
total revenue for some American companies, and some 
American companies would not be able to survive without it. 
The first secondary question about the security 
implications of China allowing foreign companies to own 
part of its network has also been answered.  The most 
effective way to protect national secrets is to properly 
protect the information resource rather than the 
transmission instrument.  Therefore, if China has national 
secrets it does not want foreign countries to hear, then 
encrypting the data is the most effective way to protect 
national security.  Experience in the United States shows 
ownership of telecommunications infrastructure is not a 
foolproof method of safeguarding state secrets and concerns 
that national security will be threatened by foreign direct 
investment are greatly exaggerated.   
The second secondary question about whether accession 
into the WTO will change China telecom policy toward 
foreign involvement has also been answered.  Chinese 
telecom policy toward foreign involvement has changed 
considerably in recent years to reflect its WTO 
commitments.  China went from not allowing foreign 
companies to allowing up to 50 percent foreign investment 
in some areas.  China will also further strengthen those 
regulations and policies with actual laws in the near 
future.  China's new telecommunication laws are due out in 
the very near future. 
Finally, the last secondary question about which U.S. 
wireless telecom companies will be affected most by China's 
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accession into the WTO has been answered.  Qualcomm, 
UTStarcom, Motorola, and Lucent Technologies are the 
American wireless telecom companies that have benefited the 
most from China joining the WTO.  This analysis is based on 
supply and equipment contracts, along with joint ventures, 
that the companies made with Chinese wireless companies.  
Additionally, Openwave Systems, 3 Com, and LCC 
International have all entered into joint ventures with 
Chinese wireless firms that will prove to be beneficial in 
the future. 
However, it is surprising more American wireless 
telecom companies have not entered into more joint ventures 
with Chinese firms.  Less than two years after China's 
admission to the WTO, the widely anticipated "foreign 
invasion" did not happen due partly to the severe downturn 
in the telecom industry and concerns over Chinese 
regulations and returns for foreign investment.  There have 
been only five joint ventures between American wireless 
companies and Chinese firms from January 2002 to July 2003.  
Additionally, even though Motorola and Lucent already had 
several joint ventures in place before China joined the 
WTO, both companies have not established any new joint 
ventures since.  
Many American wireless companies are waiting to see 
which direction China is heading for its future 3G wireless 
standard.  An announcement is expected by the end of this 
year or early next year which 3G wireless standard China is 
going to use.  However, most likely, the Chinese government 
will issue licenses for three different 3G standards.  
China Unicom with most likely adopt CDMA2000 as its future 
3G standard due to backward compatibility issues.  
Additionally, China Mobile will probably adopt W-CDMA for 
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the same reasons.  Nevertheless, the Chinese government has 
invested millions of dollars into its domestic 3G standard, 
TD-SCDMA; therefore, some Chinese wireless company will 
likely receive a license to operate it.  
China has the largest cellular networks market in the 
world and continues to increase its lead.  Currently, there 
are over 230 million mobile phone subscribers in China but 
only a 16.2 percent penetration rate.  Analysts therefore 
predict that China will eventually be twice the size of the 
industries in Europe and the United States combined.  There 
is no doubt plenty of room for American wireless 
telecommunication companies to get a piece of the lucrative 
Chinese wireless telecommunication pie.   
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